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1. Introduction 
The knowledge argument is something that is both an ideal for philosophy and yet 
surprisingly rare: a simple, valid argument for an interesting and important conclusion, with 
plausible premises. From a compelling thought-experiment and a few apparently innocuous 
assumptions, the argument seems to give us the conclusion, a priori, that physicalism is 
false. Given the apparent power of this apparently simple argument, it is not surprising that 
philosophers have worried over the argument and its proper diagnosis: physicalists have 
disputed its validity, or soundness or both; in response, non-physicalists have attempted to 
reformulate the argument to show its real anti-physicalist lesson. 
 I disagree with both groups of philosophers: I think the argument is sound, but that it 
does not show that physicalism is false. What the argument shows is that there is some 
propositional or factual knowledge which you can only have if you have certain experiences. 
This is an important, interesting and fairly controversial conclusion, but it is consistent with 
both physicalism and dualism. The knowledge argument, I claim, is an argument about 
knowledge, not about the metaphysics of the mind.  
 I first expound the knowledge argument in its least contentious, controversial version, 
and give a little historical background. I then show why the standard (physicalist) critiques of 
the argument miss their mark, why the argument does not establish dualism, what the real 
lesson of the argument is, and why the dualists’ required developments of the argument lack 
suasive or dialectical force. But first, the argument itself. 
 This paper develops and corrects some of the ideas about the knowledge argument first put 1
forward in Crane (2001 chapter 3), and Crane (2003). Thanks to Sam Coleman, Kati Farkas, Lizzie 
Fricker, Philip Goff, Henry Taylor and especially Howard Robinson for discussion of this argument, 
and to participants at a 2016 workshop in Cambridge on Robinson’s latest book (Robinson 2016), 
and at the 2017 Midwest Epistemology Workshop in St Louis. The paper was written with the help 
of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation, New Directions in the Study of the Mind. 
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2. The knowledge argument summarised 
Many things have been called the knowledge argument, but the essence of the argument is 
a thought-experiment where someone is imagined to have complete knowledge of a certain 
kind A, but lacks knowledge of another kind B. Scenarios are then sometimes envisaged in 
which they gain genuine knowledge of kind B, or it is tacitly assumed that they have it 
anyway. So the knowledge they had of the kind A cannot be all there is to know. Of course, 
the case which we are interested in is where A knowledge is ‘physical’ and B knowledge is 
‘phenomenal’; and the conclusion of interest is the one where the fact that not all knowledge 
is ‘physical’ is supposed to entail that physicalism is false. 
 The scenario envisaged by Frank Jackson (1982) is the thought-experiment of Mary 
the omniscient scientist who lives in a black-and-white room, and then sees something red 
for the first time. Nothing of great significance depends on the specific details of this 
particular version of the thought experiment. For example, if someone finds the scenario of 
someone learning physics in Mary’s predicament hard to imagine — maybe because her 
physics books cannot all be in black and white — then they should imagine instead Mary 
being blind, and then recovering her sight. Physics can be in braille (Maddox 2007). By the 
same token, the argument does not depend on anything specific to vision — it could be 
formulated in terms of the knowledge given in hearing, smell or taste.  
 Given the basic assumptions of the thought experiment, we can express the 
argument in terms of the following three premises and a conclusion: 
Premise 1: Mary knows all the physical facts about seeing red in the black and white 
room. 
Premise 2: Mary learns something new when she leaves the room and sees red for the 
first time. 
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Premise 3: What Mary learns is a fact. 
Conclusion: Not all facts are physical facts. 
If physicalism is the doctrine that not all facts are physical facts, then the conclusion is the 
negation of physicalism. 
 A few brief clarifications about the dialectical role of the premises. The first premise is 
simply a stipulation of one of the features of the thought-experiment. Accepting this premise 
and accepting the thought-experiment are basically the same thing. Of course, one might 
reject the thought-experiment on broadly methodological grounds, as Daniel Dennett (1991) 
famously did; if one does this, there is no need to discuss the rest of the argument. After all, 
one can hardly say ‘oh yes the thought experiment is fine, it’s just that Mary wouldn’t know all 
the physical facts in that situation’ — for the thought experiment is, by definition, a 
supposedly possible situation in which Mary knows all the physical facts. 
 The second premise, unlike the first, is not simply a stipulation involved in the 
thought-experiment; it is rather something we are invited to conclude after being told the 
story of Mary leaving the room and seeing red for the first time. It would be a coherent 
reaction to the argument to accept the first premise and deny the second, for example; or to 
put it another way, to accept the coherence or intelligibility of the thought-experiment and yet 
reject premise 2. In this way, premise 2 is a distinct claim from the mere coherence of the 
thought-experiment. 
 Premise 3 makes explicit what is needed in order for the argument to be valid. Given 
the widely held view that there are at least three kinds of knowledge — knowing that, 
knowing how and knowing things — it could be claimed that the argument equivocates if it 
just involves premises 1 and 2. For it may be that premise 1 is about knowing that, but for all 
the thought-experiment says, premise 2 might be about knowing how (or ‘ability’ knowledge) 
or knowing things (‘acquaintance’ knowledge). The point of premise 3 is to explicitly rule out 
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those options. So those who adopt the ability response (Lewis 1983, Nemirow 1990, Mellor 
1992) or the acquaintance response (Churchland 1987, Conee 2004, Tye 2009) can accept 
premise 2 and reject premise 3.  
 The story of Mary and the black-and-white room comes, of course, from Frank 
Jackson’s articles ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ (1982) and ‘What Mary did not Know’ (1986). 
Because of the catchiness of the Mary story, the knowledge argument has sometimes been 
attributed to Jackson, although he himself has been generous in acknowledging influences 
and independent presentations of the argument. Of these presentations, attention must be 
drawn to Howard Robinson’s concise statement at the opening of his Matter and Sense, 
published in the same year as Jackson’s ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’: 
Imagine that a deaf scientist should become the world’s leading expert on the 
neurology of hearing. Thus, if we suppose neurology to be more advanced than 
present, we can imagine that he knows everything there is to know about the 
physical processes involved in hearing, from the ear-drum in. It remains intuitively 
obvious that there is something which this scientist will not know, namely what it is 
like to hear. (Robinson 1982: 4) 
In his recent reflections on the knowledge argument, Robinson comments that he ‘did not 
then treat this as a refutation of physicalism, but rather as a way of setting up the problem 
that faced the physicalist’ (Robinson 2016). But it is easy to see how this brief vignette 
contains almost the entire argument as represented above — all it lacks is the claim that 
knowledge of what it is like to hear is knowledge of a fact. With this added, Robinson’s 
argument is as clear a statement of the knowledge argument as any. 
 As a number of writers (e.g. Nida-Rümelin 2009) have pointed out, something like 
the knowledge argument is present in C.D. Broad’s The Mind and its Place in Nature 
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(1927), Herbert Feigl’s ‘The “Mental” and the “Physical”’ (1958), and Thomas Nagel’s 
‘What is it Like to be a Bat?’ (1974). To these precursors of the argument, I would add my 
own favourite statement of its basic idea, by Bertrand Russell:  
It is obvious that a man who can see knows things which a blind man cannot know; 
but a blind man can know the whole of physics. Thus the knowledge which other men 
have and he has not is not a part of physics. (Russell 1927: 389) 
However, the relationship between these precursors and the arguments of Jackson and 
Robinson is not straightforward. Robinson and Jackson in 1982 were opposing 
physicalism, as was Broad (in the name of ‘mechanism’); but Russell draws no explicit 
conclusion about physicalism. Nor did Feigl and Nagel (at least in 1974) take their own 
‘knowledge arguments’ to tell against the truth of physicalism. Feigl was defending a 
version of the identity theory, combined with the view that there are two kinds of 
knowledge of the mind-brain. Nagel’s conclusion was that even though physicalism 
(materialism) is true, it is in a certain sense unintelligible to us. 
 The arguments of Jackson and Robinson, therefore, do add something new and 
clear which was not explicitly there in these predecessors: the use of these considerations 
about knowledge to undermine the doctrine of physicalism. Physicalists quickly rose to the 
challenge and over the past few decades have offered various criticisms of the argument. 
These have been effectively discussed in great detail in many places, and my aim here is 
not to present a full survey of these discussions. Rather, what I want to do is to identify 
what seem to me to be the essential features of the most common physicalist responses. 
3. The usual physicalist responses 
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Making premise 3 explicit enables us to treat physicalists as objecting to the argument as 
unsound, rather than invalid. This useful simplification allows us to group physicalist 
responses to the argument into those which deny premise 2 or those which deny premise 
3. Less common, in my experience, is the response mentioned above which denies the 
coherence of the thought-experiment — in other words, which denies premise 1. Here I will 
ignore this less popular response. It may be that it deserves a detailed treatment, but I will 
not give this here.  
 The denial of premise 3 can be dealt with quickly here; what a physicalist should 
say about premise 2 will take a little more unravelling. Those who deny premise 3 do so 
because they think either that Mary acquires only ability knowledge, or that she acquires 
only acquaintance knowledge. The existence and nature of ability knowledge and 
acquaintance knowledge has been intensely discussed in the last decade (e.g. Bengson 
and Moffett 2011; Tye 2009). It is true that if there were no such thing as ability knowledge 
or acquaintance knowledge, then these responses to premise 3 would fail. But this does 
not mean that if there were such things, the responses would succeed. To deny premise 3 
you have to deny that what Mary learns is a fact; but it is plain that acquiring ability 
knowledge or acquaintance knowledge is compatible with learning a fact. What these 
physicalists have to show, then, is that Mary only acquires ability knowledge or 
acquaintance knowledge, and no propositional knowledge. There is a lot that can be said 
here, but I will rest with the significant observation that most physicalists make no explicit 
attempt do this. An exception is David Lewis, who bases his critique of the argument on 
the assumption that ‘phenomenal information’ (i.e. the objects of propositional knowledge 
of phenomenal states) must be rejected by physicalists (Lewis 1999: 285). I will argue 
below that physicalists can accept this kind of information — at least in one sense of the 
word — with impunity. 
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 This brings us to premise 2. On the face of it, it is hard to deny that Mary learns 
something, as the story is usually told. In general, it seems that having new experiences 
gives us new knowledge — at the very least, it gives us some knowledge of what it is like, 
in a perfectly ordinary sense, to have such experiences. How could the experience of 
seeing red for the first time fail to give knowledge? One could, of course, reject the 
coherence of the whole scenario, but in the way I am setting the argument up, this is a 
denial of premise 1, not premise 2.  
 In his more recent guise as a physicalist, Frank Jackson has defended a denial of 
premise 2 which deserves mention, not least because of Jackson’s role in setting up the 
original argument. Jackson’s way of denying (2) appeals to the representational theory of 
experience: the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by its representational 
content. So when Mary experiences something red she comes to be in a state which 
represents a property — phenomenal red — which does not exist:  
Physicalists can allow that people are sometimes in states that represent that things 
have a nonphysical property. Examples are people who believe that there are fairies. 
What physicalists must deny is that such properties are instantiated. (Jackson 2003) 
Jackson’s response to the knowledge argument would make sense if the argument assumed 
or entailed that what Mary learns about are ‘qualia’ conceived of as non-physical, non-
intentional property. Then his response would be: Mary’s experience is a representation of 
something which does not exist, a non-physical quale. But there are no such things as 
qualia. Therefore Mary’s experience is an illusion and cannot be the basis of any new 
knowledge of the world. Mary learns nothing new. 
 Of course every theory of mind must allow that some conscious experiences are 
illusions. But the experience of colour is just one kind of conscious experience, and nothing 
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in the general structure of the knowledge argument requires either a realist theory of colours, 
or a commitment to qualia (conceived of as non-intentional properties of experience). The 
knowledge argument is compatible with a Galilean theory of colours, and also with 
intentionalism or representationalism about experience. For a Galilean about colour, the 
argument would just need to be formulated in terms of some experienced phenomenal 
property other than colour (taste, smell, pain…). And the argument only needs one case to 
make its point. So Jackson’s response will only work in general if all these kinds of features 
of conscious experience are illusions. But this is barely credible. It is barely credible, for 
example, that pain is an illusion. But Jackson needs to make this claim if his argument is to 
work. 
 There is little to be gained for a physicalist, I think, by digging in their heels and 
simply insisting that Mary gains no knowledge. It’s not that this position is incoherent, but 
rather that it lacks any plausibility, given our normal views about the relationship between 
knowledge and experience. And, as we shall see, it is completely unnecessary for a 
physicalist to insist on this, when a far more plausible response to the argument is 
available. 
 This far more plausible response is simple, and has been around in the literature at 
least since Terence Horgan’s 1984 response to Jackson’s original paper. The essence of it 
is this: the fact that Mary gains new knowledge does not in itself show that it is knowledge 
of something non-physical. In Mary’s case, as in many everyday cases, we learn 
something new about the world even though the things we are learning facts about are 
things we already knew about in some other way. When we are experientially representing 
a thing or property which we have previously represented in some other way, this does not 
mean one has no new knowledge of this thing or property. This point has sometimes been 
explicated in terms of the idea of the intensionality of (propositional) knowledge (Chalmers 
1996: 141), and sometimes in terms of the comparison with Frege’s famous discussion of 
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the Morning Star and the Evening Star (Frege 1892). Two modes of presentation of 
something does not imply two things presented. 
 This response is clearly a way of accepting premise 2, since it acknowledges that 
Mary learns something new. So it would muddy the waters to describe the response as 
saying that Mary does not really learn anything new, but only learns ‘an old fact in a new 
way’ (I take the phrase from Chalmers ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge 
Argument’ §1; in her useful survey, Nida-Rümelin (2009) calls this the ‘Old Fact/New 
Knowledge’ response). If Mary does learn a new fact, then it cannot be the same fact as 
something she already knew. Should we say that the ancient astronomers who discovered 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus merely learned that Hesperus is Hesperus in a new way? Of 
course not: learning that Hesperus is Phosphorus is in no sense whatsoever a ‘way’ of 
learning that Hesperus is Hesperus. The ‘old fact in a new way’ talk is a convoluted 
formulation of a much simpler idea: that Mary learns something new and this does not 
imply that the entities about which she gains this knowledge are distinct from the entities 
she knew all about in the black and white room.  
 It may be replied to this that, in philosophy at least, ‘fact’ is ambiguous: facts can be 
constituents of reality (‘the world is the totality of facts’: Wittgenstein 1921) or they can be 
objects of knowledge (‘a fact is a thought which is true’: Frege 1918-19). So perhaps 
premise 3 is ambiguous and the ‘old fact in a new way’ talk is just supposed to make this 
explicit: Mary learns a new (Frege-style) fact which is a mode of presentation of an old 
(Wittgenstein-style) fact.  
 It’s true of course that these two notions of fact have been used in 20th century 
philosophy, and they are both perfectly legitimate notions which have their different uses. 
But this does not mean that the knowledge argument, as I stated it above, equivocates. 
The argument talks about learning facts and knowing facts — where the knowledge in 
question is clearly propositional. But it is only facts in Frege’s sense which can be the 
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objects of propositional knowledge: what you know is true, it is something that can be 
learned, and something that can be conveyed to others. Being true, learned and conveyed 
to others — these are not features of facts in the Wittgensteinian ‘constituent-of-reality’ 
sense. Constituents of reality are not true, and you cannot learn or convey them (as 
opposed to learning or conveying truths about them). There is a sense in which you can 
know constituents of reality — you can know people, for example — but this is not 
propositional knowledge, since propositional knowledge is knowledge of truths and truths 
are not constituents of reality in the relevant sense. And the knowledge argument is 
explicitly about propositional knowledge. (The debate about the existence of propositions 
is not relevant to this point: no-one should think that whether physicalism is true turns on 
whether propositions exist.) 
 For this reason, then, it is a mistake to say that the argument equivocates: it’s 
perfectly clear which notion of fact is involved in the argument, and the physicalist should 
have no objection to this notion of fact, so long as they accept the idea of objects (or 
contents) of propositional knowledge.  
 Many of those who respond to the argument in this way have put it in terms of 
Mary’s gaining a new kind of concept, a ‘phenomenal concept’, which she did not have in 
the black and white room (Balog 2009; Papineau 2002). If concepts are in some way the 
constituents of states of knowledge, then this new concept would indeed explain why the 
knowledge is also new. However, phenomenal concepts are somewhat controversial 
(Crane 2005; Sundström 2011), and it would be better not to rest the defence of premise 2 
on such controversial ideas. After all, the truth of premise 2 seems more obvious than any 
complex theoretical claims about concepts. And maybe Edouard Machery (2009) is right, 
and the idea of a concept will play no role in a future science of the mind. But this should 
not undermine the idea that Mary would gain new knowledge in the scenario described. 
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 Fortunately, it is not necessary to adopt any novel theory of concepts in order to 
maintain premise 2. Mary could simply employ a demonstrative concept — ‘that is what 
red looks like!’ — which is a kind of concept she also could employ when in the black and 
white room. A new experience can provide the opportunity for new knowledge — 
knowledge of a new truth or proposition — using concepts one had before. Just as one 
might express one’s new knowledge of a person by saying ‘That is the same person I met 
in Albuquerque last year’, so Mary can use a demonstrative to express her new knowledge 
deriving from her new experience (Crane 2003). It is a further step, and not obligatory, to 
explain the truth of this demonstrative judgement in terms of phenomenal concepts in 
Balog’s or Papineau’s senses. 
 Howard Robinson (2016) has combined the idea that Mary gains factual knowledge 
with the idea that she gains knowledge by acquaintance. In laying out the options in 
response to the knowledge argument, Robinson says that ‘Mary lacked and later acquired 
some factual knowledge concerning the nature of phenomenal colour’ (2016: 21). I agree 
this is the right response to the argument. But I disagree with his further gloss on this:  
The information in question will not be propositional, but be a form of knowledge by 
acquaintance, but it will still be factual information concerning the nature of colour 
and colour experience. (2016: 21) 
I see no difference between factual knowledge and propositional knowledge — factual 
knowledge is knowledge of Frege-facts or true propositions. I don’t think there is another 
viable sense of factual knowledge, though there is a viable sense of ‘fact’: the 
Wittgensteinian sense. But for the reasons given above, Wittgensteinian facts are not the 
objects of factual knowledge. And knowledge by acquaintance — if it exists as a distinctive 
kind at all — is compatible with physicalism and its negation. So in his defence of the 
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knowledge argument Robinson should only appeal to factual knowledge. (I will return to 
Robinson’s views in §5 below.) 
 The lesson I want to draw here is that the overwhelmingly plausible physicalist 
response to the argument — that the same things can be known about in different ways — 
is compatible with accepting all three premises of the argument. Those who make this 
response should not dispute the claim that Mary learns something new, and (if they want to 
maintain the analogy with other cases of the intensionality of knowledge ascriptions) they 
should not deny that Mary learns a fact. The standard response, then, should not dispute the 
premises of the argument as I have presented them above. 
 And since the conclusion follows from the premises, the standard response should 
not dispute the conclusion either. So defenders of this response should say that not all facts 
are physical facts. This might look like a strange thing for a physicalist to say, until we take 
into account what the knowledge argument means (and must mean, if it is to be intelligible) 
by ‘physical fact’. This is really the key to understanding the argument, as we shall see. 
4. Physicalism and physical truths 
As we have seen, the knowledge argument employs the notion of a fact as an object of 
knowledge, so spelled out literally the conclusion says that not all objects of knowledge are 
physical objects of knowledge. I am arguing that physicalism should be unworried by this 
conclusion: someone can be a physicalist and accept that not all objects of knowledge are 
physical. To defend this position requires answering two questions: what is physicalism? And 
second, what makes an object of knowledge physical in the relevant sense? 
 There has been an extensive debate about the content of physicalism over the last 
few decades (Melnyck 2003, Montero 2013, Ney 2008, Papineau 2001, Poland 1994, Stoljar 
2010). Most of these details — e.g. what counts as physics, ‘Hempel’s dilemma’, the precise 
statement of the causal closure principle etc. — need not concern us here. What should be 
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uncontroversial about physicalism, these days at least, is that it is a thesis about the world, 
about reality, about what there is. It is an ontological thesis. Physicalists might say, for 
example, that all objects and events are physical (sometimes called ‘token physicalism’) or 
they might say that all properties are physical (sometimes called ‘type physicalism’). Or they 
might say that all states of affairs in D.M. Armstrong’s sense (‘facts’ in the Wittgensteinian 
sense) are physical. Or they might say that everything is determined by its physical nature, 
or that everything supervenes on physical reality. However they think ‘physical’ should be 
defined, physicalists these days tend to treat physicalism as an ontological doctrine, a 
doctrine about what reality contains. 
 It wasn’t always like this. In his essay, ‘Psychology in Physical Language’ Rudolf 
Carnap described the thesis of physicalism as ‘physical language is a universal language, 
that is, a language into which every sentence may be translated’ (Carnap 1932-33: 107). It 
was characteristic of the logical empiricist philosophy of the day (and the later philosophy 
which it influenced) to formulate ontological doctrines in linguistic terms. This practice 
survived into, for example, Chisholm’s (1957) attempts to find linguistic criteria of 
intentionality, which is supposed to distinguish the mental from the physical (see also 
Dennett 1969, chapter 1). But these days physicalism is not formulated as a doctrine about 
sentences. 
 The upshot is this. Given that there can be genuinely different facts in the ‘object of 
knowledge’ sense (Frege facts), without this difference corresponding to any ontological 
difference, it follows that physicalism as an ontological thesis is not a thesis about facts in the 
‘object of knowledge’ sense. So the pre-physicalist Jackson was therefore quite wrong when 
he said that ‘if physicalism is true, Mary knows all there is to know’ (1986: 291). Physicalism 
can be true and yet Mary in the room can be ignorant of certain facts. The knowledge 
argument as stated in section 2 above does not refute physicalism. 
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 This brings us to the second question: what makes an object of knowledge (or true 
proposition) ‘physical’ in the sense employed by the knowledge argument? This is not the 
same question as what ‘physical’ means for physicalists. For that latter question is about how 
to make an ontological classification; but the former question is about how to classify objects 
of propositional knowledge. The ‘physical facts’ according to the knowledge argument are all 
those true propositions that Mary could learn within the black-and-white room scenario. So 
let’s ask what kinds of propositions Mary could learn within this scenario. Obviously she can 
learn the truths of physics. But what else? The pre-physicalist Jackson says that what Mary 
learns is knowledge that is part of physics, ‘in a wide sense of “physical” that includes 
everything in completed physics, chemistry and neurophysiology’ (Jackson 1986: 291). He 
is surely right that it clearly makes no difference to the story whether Mary learns facts 
about the physiology of the brain in addition to facts about fundamental physics. But the 
same could be said about the facts of theoretical psychology. It’s in the spirit of the 
knowledge argument to say that Mary could learn everything in a completed scientific 
psychology in the room. And she would still not know what it was like to see red. Similarly, 
a  blind person could learn a ‘completed’ psychology of vision and not know what it was 
like to see.  
 Pushing this idea a bit further, let’s suppose that some kind of dualism is true, but it 
is a scientific dualism: a dualism which appeals to irreducible psychological laws which talk 
about or quantify over irreducible mental properties, which do not necessarily supervene 
on physical properties. Not all forms of dualism are like this of course; some forms of 
dualism are explicit that there cannot be a science of the mental at all. But it serves my 
purpose if there merely could be a form of dualism like this — indeed, Chalmers (1996) 
speculates about such a naturalistic dualism. Now if Mary were to learn such a theory in 
the black and white room, would it help her to know what it was like to see red? In so far 
as we have a grip on what this science might be, the answer seems to me clearly no.  
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 What lesson should we draw from this? What do all these propositions have in 
common? It is misleading to say that anything that Mary can learn inside the room is 
physical, given that this word has an independent sense, the sense employed in the 
ontological debates about physicalism. So let’s not introduce a second sense of ‘physical’ 
to go along with the second sense of ‘fact’. What we should say instead is that the facts 
that Mary can learn in the back-and-white room scenario are the kind of facts that do not 
require any specific kind of experience. You may need some kind of experience in general 
in order to learn the full scientific theory of colour vision — you have to get the information 
somehow — but it is plausible that you don’t need full chromatic colour vision. Similarly, 
you may need some kind of experience or other to learn the full scientific theory of taste 
and olfaction; but you don’t need the experience of all the tastes. This is the point Russell 
is making when he says that a blind man can learn the whole of physics. 
 In an earlier paper (Crane 2003), I called the kind of knowledge Mary can acquire in 
the black-and-white room ‘book-learning’. This was inspired by David Lewis’s remark that 
‘intuitive starting point wasn’t just that physics lessons couldn’t help the inexperienced to 
know what it is like. It was that lessons couldn’t help’ (Lewis 1999: 281). The idea of 
something that can be learned in a book is vivid, but it is hard to make wholly explicit. 
What sorts of things can be learned in books, and what cannot? What the knowledge 
argument shows, at the very least, is that this is an important question for epistemology. 
The argument shows that the distinction between book-learning and non-book-learning is 
not the same as that between propositional and non-propositional knowledge, since Mary’s 
new knowledge is, as I have argued, propositional. This is a significant result for 
epistemology. 
 John Perry (2001) has argued that Mary’s new knowledge is just a special case of 
indexical knowledge. When Perry, following a trail of sugar in the supermarket in order to 
alert the person making the mess, discovers that the leak is coming from his own bag, he 
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gains the knowledge that he is making a mess. This is new propositional knowledge, but it 
is not book-learning: in order to acquire it, Perry had to recognise something about his 
position in the world at that moment. He had to occupy a specific position in the world; his 
knowledge was not available without occupying that position. Perry claims that Mary’s 
position is comparable to this. And just as Perry the shopper’s predicament has no 
ontological consequences, Mary’s predicament does not either. 
 The analogy is plausible, but does it give an account the kind of knowledge Mary 
gains? I myself once thought something like this (Crane 2003), but now I think things 
cannot be that simple. Consider a Laplacean demon who has a complete theoretical, third-
personal, objective knowledge of all the facts before Perry’s shopper’s discovery. The 
demon would be able to deduce that Perry’s shopper will be able to know that he is the 
shopper making the mess. The demon would not, of course, be able to know that she 
herself, the Laplacean demon, was making a mess, because it is not true — she cannot 
truly think the proposition that Perry is thinking. But despite this, she knows — without 
remainder, I want to say — which proposition it is that Perry comes to know.  
 The situation is different when it comes to Mary’s predicament. Given that she has 
total knowledge of physics, psychology, linguistics etc., the demon would be able to predict 
that Mary will think ‘this is what red looks like’ after she sees red for the first time. But if the 
demon herself had not seen red, then there would still be something significant lacking 
from her knowledge: what red looks like. This is a more substantial lack than in the Perry 
case. There the demon knew exactly what was going on, but in the case of seeing red, she 
was genuinely lacking something. For this reason, I don’t think Perry is right that Mary’s 
predicament is explained simply by the theory of indexicality. Something else is going on. 
 The conclusion of the knowledge argument is not simply that some knowledge 
requires experience; it is that there is some specific kind of knowledge which requires a 
specific kind of experience, and that this cannot be obtained in another way. Mary’s 
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knowledge of what red looks like is knowledge of this kind. It is expressible in a proposition 
— red looks like this or this is what red looks like — but this proposition requires specific 
kind of visual experience in order to be learned. The idea that there might be knowledge of 
this kind is not trivial, but the knowledge argument provides one plausible reason for 
believing in it. Exactly how this species or kind of knowledge should be characterised, it 
seems to me, is a substantial question for epistemology. 
  
5. How to get the dualist conclusion 
In my interpretation of the argument, then, dualism does not follow from the conclusion of 
the knowledge argument. I disagree therefore with Robinson when he says, ‘if the contrast 
between Mary and others, or between Mary before and after is a genuine one, then property 
dualism is established and one must adjust one’s views accordingly’ (Robinson 2016: 59). I 
reject this inference, not because I reject property dualism, but because one can accept that 
there is a genuine contrast, and still be a property monist. The contrast lies purely in Mary’s 
experience and in her knowledge of the situation. 
 It is worth asking, then, why some philosophers think that the argument or something 
like it does establish dualism. In the final section of this paper I will venture a hypothesis 
about this, by way of a discussion of Robinson’s version of the argument in his recent book, 
From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance (2016).  
 Robinson presents the argument in a slightly different way from the way I present it 
above. Here is his version: 
(1) Mary knows all those facts about the perception of chromatic colour which can in 
principle be expressed in the vocabulary of physical science.  
(2) Unlike those who have normal visual experiences, Mary does not know the 
phenomenal nature of chromatic colour (what it is like to perceive chromatic colour). 
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  Therefore 
(3) The phenomenal nature of chromatic colour in principle cannot be characterised 
using the vocabulary of physical science. 
(4) The nature of any physical thing, state or property can be expressed in the 
vocabulary of physical science. 
  Therefore 
(5) The phenomenal nature of chromatic colour is not a physical thing, state or 
property.  
(Robinson 2016: 16-17) 
One obvious difference between my version of the argument and Robinson’s is that 
Robinson focuses on Mary’s predicament inside the room, rather than on the change after 
the new experience. Robinson takes it for granted at this stage that Mary will gain new 
knowledge after seeing red, and of course I am happy to follow him in this. 
 What about the rest of his argument? Robinson’s premise (1) is weaker than my 
premise (1) (it is a consequence of the latter) but otherwise his version introduces some 
somewhat different ideas. Premise (2) talks about knowing ‘the phenomenal nature’ of a 
property, which I take to be equivalent to knowing what it is like to experience that property. 
To show that (3) follows from (1) and (2) we need two things. First, we need to show that 
the knowledge in (1) is the same kind as that in (2) — i.e. propositional or factual 
knowledge — to avoid equivocation (as explained in §2 above). Robinson should adopt 
something like the reasoning I gave in §2 for the univocality of the knowledge claims here. 
And second, we should stipulate that ’expressed’ and ‘characterised’ mean the same thing 
in this context. Given these two points, (3) will follow from (1) and (2). Premise (1) says 
Mary knows all the facts that can in principle be expressed by physics, and (2) says that 
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she does not know the facts about what it’s like. So the facts about what it’s like to 
experience the property cannot be something in principle expressed by physics.  
 (It would be possible to question the equation of ‘expressed’ and ‘characterised’, on 
the grounds that physics can characterise an experience without expressing it — a 
scientific description of a brain state, for a physicalist, can be a way of characterising 
something which is as a matter of fact an experience, but the scientific description does 
not in any plausible way ‘express’ the experience. However, I don’t think Robinson is 
relying on any significant distinction between expressing and characterising, so I will not  
pursue this criticism of his argument.) 
 So far, Robinson’s argument is fairly similar to the argument as I presented it above. 
But premise (4) is an additional premise. It says that the nature of a physical thing can be 
expressed in the vocabulary of physical science. This is unobjectionable in itself, but if the 
conclusion (5) is to follow, then premise (4) should say ‘the entire nature of any physical 
thing can be expressed in the vocabulary of physical science’. If we do not add ‘entire’ (or 
some synonym), then it would be possible for a physicalist to say that physical science can 
express or characterise the nature of experiences (which are, as a matter of fact, identical 
with brain states), but that other aspects their nature can also be expressed using other 
descriptive materials. But this fact does not entail that this other aspect is not, ontologically 
speaking, a physical thing. On this view, although physical science can give a 
characterisation of the state, it would not give a full characterisation. Full characterisations 
can only be given when one employs all the concepts available; and some of these 
concepts are only available to those who have had the experience. But the experience can 
be a physical state for all that. In fact, this seems to me the essence of the ‘phenomenal 
concept’ response to the argument, stripped of the confused idea of an ‘old fact in a new 
way’. I myself am sceptical about the specific idea of phenomenal concepts employed by 
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Papineau, Balog and others. But this is not relevant to the dialectical point here against 
Robinson. 
 It may be objected that once it is accepted that there are ‘aspects’ of things which 
cannot be described in physical terms, then physicalism has conceded the point. But this 
is not so; physicalists can allow such aspects, so long as they are conceived of 
epistemologically. The physicalism I have in mind has been helpfully labelled by Robert 
Howell ‘inclusive subjective physicalism’, according to which ‘a complete physics will refer 
to every property and event that there is. There are simply ways of understanding those 
properties that will not be imparted by an understanding of the theoretical descriptions of 
physics’ (Howell 2009: 316). 
  How can this kind of physicalist accept these aspects? Physicalists accept 
experiences, and (I would argue) they should accept that you don’t know what it’s like to 
have a kind of experience unless you have had one of that kind. So they should say that 
experiences have the following aspect, feature or property: they are such that you cannot 
know what they are like without having had them. Therefore you cannot know what they 
are like through book-learning alone (as Einstein is supposed to have said, ‘science 
cannot give you the taste of chicken soup’). But this is just another way of distinguishing 
between the knowledge you get from books (whatever books are exactly) and the 
knowledge you get from tasting something. And that distinction itself is just a consequence 
of the sort of thing that tastes (etc.) are.  
 So Robinson’s argument will get its dualist conclusion if premise (4) is modified to 
include the word ‘entire’: ‘the entire nature of any physical thing, state or property can be 
expressed in the vocabulary of physical science’. But this is not something a physicalist 
has to accept. That was the upshot of my discussion in this section and §3. 
 Other versions of the knowledge employ the idea of knowing something in its 
entirety — but in the mirror image, so to speak, of the claim that Robinson needs. They 
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use instead the idea that experiencing something enables you to know its phenomenal 
nature in its entirety. Reflection on an experience therefore enables you to know, ipso 
facto, that it is not also a physical phenomenon. As Nida-Rümelin comments: 
The intuitive idea … has been expressed in different ways. Some say that qualia 
‘have no hidden sides’. Others say that qualia are not natural kind terms [sic.] in 
that it is not up to the sciences to tell us what having an experience of a particular 
kind amounts to (we know what it amounts to by having them and attending to the 
quality at issue). It is quite clear that an account of this intuitive idea has to be one 
of the ingredients of a dualist defense of the knowledge argument. (Nida-Rümelin 
2015) 
What Nida-Rümelin here calls the intuitive idea is not just one of the ingredients of a 
dualist knowledge argument — it is, arguably, the active ingredient in a wholly different 
argument from the one discussed above (§§2-3). For if you accept the idea that 
experience allows you to know an experienced property in its entirety, then you need little 
else to get the dualist conclusion. For it is plain that you cannot learn that an experience is 
a physical state merely by having that experience and reflecting upon it. So if the 
experience is supposed to give you knowledge of the entire nature of a phenomenal 
properties, you could refute the identity theory simply by reflecting on your experience.  
 Philip Goff has recently put this point by saying that concepts of phenomenal states 
are ‘transparent’ — they reveal the nature of those states (2017: 74). Although he himself 
thinks that phenomenal concepts are transparent, Goff argues plausibly that ‘the 
knowledge argument does not have the resources to establish’ this claim, ‘without which 
Mary’s knowledge is no threat to physicalism’ (2017: 75). This is, in effect, one of the 
lessons of the present paper. 
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 There are two substantial assumptions, then, that can be used to derive dualist 
conclusions when added to the knowledge argument’s premises. One is the assumption 
Robinson needs: that the entire nature of any physical thing, state or property can be 
expressed in the vocabulary of physical science. The other is what Nida-Rümelin calls the 
‘intuitive idea’, and what Goff calls ‘transparency’: that the entire nature of a phenomenal 
property can be known from experiencing it. The first assumption can be used when you 
concentrate, as Robinson does, on what Mary doesn’t know in the black and white room; 
the second assumption can be used when you concentrate on what Mary comes to know 
in having the relevant new experience.   
 These are both very strong assumptions. And although it is possible to build 
arguments against physicalism using one or both of them (see Nida-Rümelin 2007; Goff 
2017), it should be clear that they cannot be derived from the uncontroversial premises of 
the original 1982 knowledge arguments of Jackson and Robinson. But without these 
additional assumptions, physicalism is untouched by the argument. 
  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have not disputed the significance of the knowledge argument itself, but 
only its usual interpretations. I have disputed both the dualist interpretation, and the usual 
physicalist interpretations. Although not a physicalist myself, I argued above that the 
argument is not effective against physicalism. But this is not because the argument itself, 
considered in terms of the most plausible reading of its premises and conclusion, is invalid 
or unsound. It is because the real target of the argument is not physicalism, but a certain 
conception of knowledge. So instead of an unsound argument against physicalism, we 
have a sound argument which identifies a particularly important form of knowledge. The 
precise nature of that knowledge is a matter for further epistemological investigation. 
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 One final point. Physicalists and non-physicalists have commented on the fact the 
knowledge argument moves from epistemological premises to metaphysical conclusions, 
and some have wondered how this is possible. The answer is that in the case of what I 
think of as the core of the knowledge argument, it is not. Whether or not such 
metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from other epistemological premises I will not 
discuss; I restrict myself to the conclusion that the knowledge argument itself does not 
yield any significant metaphysical conclusions. 
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